This study explores the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on economic growth and endogenous market structure in a Schumpeterian growth model. We …nd that when the number of …rms is …xed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies serve to increase economic growth as in previous studies. However, when the number of …rms adjusts endogenously in the long run, R&D subsidies increase economic growth but decrease the number of …rms, whereas patent breadth expands the number of …rms but reduces economic growth. Therefore, R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the purpose of stimulating long-run economic growth.
Introduction
What are the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on economic growth and market structure? To explore this question, we consider a second-generation R&D-based growth model, pioneered by Peretto (1998) , Young (1998) , Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom (2000) . To our knowledge, this is the …rst study that analyzes patent breadth in a secondgeneration R&D-based growth model. The model features two dimensions of technological progress. In the vertical dimension, …rms improve the quality of existing products. In the horizontal dimension, …rms invent new products. In this scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure (EMS) measured by the number of …rms in equilibrium, we …nd some interesting di¤erences between patent breadth and R&D subsidies. At the …rst glance, these two policy instruments should have similar e¤ects on innovation and economic growth. On the one hand, patent breadth improves the incentives for innovation by increasing the private return to R&D investment. On the other hand, R&D subsidies improve the incentives for innovation by reducing the private cost of R&D investment. For example, an interesting study by Li (2001) shows that both of these policy instruments contribute to increasing innovation and economic growth in a quality-ladder growth model that features exogenous market structure. However, in a Schumpeterian growth model with EMS, we …nd that patent breadth and R&D subsidies have drastically di¤erent implications on economic growth and market structure. Speci…cally, when the number of …rms is …xed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies have positive e¤ects on economic growth as in previous studies. Interestingly, when the number of …rms adjusts endogenously in the long run, patent breadth expands the number of …rms but decreases economic growth, whereas R&D subsidies increase economic growth but reduce the number of …rms.
Intuitively, R&D subsidies decrease the cost of R&D investment and improve the incentives for R&D; therefore, a higher rate of R&D subsidies increases economic growth in the short run and in the long run. As for an increase in patent breadth, it raises the pro…t margin of monopolistic …rms and provides more incentives for R&D in the short run. In the long run, it encourages the entry of new …rms, which reduces average …rm size measured by the number of workers per …rm. Given that …rm size determines the incentives for R&D in the second generation model, 1 a larger patent breadth decreases long-run economic growth. These contrasting long-run implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies suggest that R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the purpose of stimulating long-run economic growth. The negative e¤ect of patent protection on innovation is consistent with case-study evidence in Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008) . As for the positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies on innovation, it is also consistent with evidence; see for example, Hall and Van Reenen (2000) for a survey of empirical studies.
This study relates to the literature on R&D-driven economic growth; see Romer (1990 Chu and Pan (2013) also …nd that increasing the strength of other patent policy levers, such as blocking patents and patentability requirement, could have a negative e¤ect on economic growth. The present study di¤ers from these previous studies that mostly focus on the longrun e¤ects of patent policy and contributes to the literature by highlighting the di¤erent short-run and long-run implications of patent protection on economic growth.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Schumpeterian growth model with EMS. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies. Section 4 concludes.
A Schumpeterian growth model with EMS
In summary, the growth-theoretic framework is based on the Schumpeterian model with inhouse R&D and EMS in Peretto (2007 Peretto ( , 2011 . In this model, labor is used as a factor input for the production of …nal goods. Final goods are either consumed by households or used as a factor input for R&D, entry and the production of intermediate goods. We incorporate patent breadth into the model and analyze its di¤erent implications from R&D subsidies on economic growth and market structure.
Household
In the economy, the population size is normalized to unity, and there is a representative household who has the following lifetime utility function:
where C t denotes consumption of …nal goods (numeraire) at time t. The parameter > 0 determines the rate of subjective discounting. The household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
A t is the real value of assets owned by the household, and r t is the real interest rate. The household has a labor endowment of L units and supplies them inelastically to earn a real wage rate w t . The household also pays a wage-income tax w t L to the government. From standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
Final goods
We follow Aghion and Howitt (2005) and Peretto (2007 Peretto ( , 2011 to assume that …nal goods Y t are produced by competitive …rms using the following production function: . From pro…t maximization, the conditional demand function for l t (i) is
and the conditional demand function for X t (i) is
where p t (i) is the price of X t (i) and the price of Y t is normalized to unity. Perfect competition implies that …nal goods producers pay
Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Existing intermediate goods …rms produce di¤erentiated goods with a technology that requires one unit of …nal goods to produce one unit of intermediate goods X t (i). Following Peretto (2011), we assume that the …rm in industry i incurs Z t units of …nal goods as a …xed operating cost, where Z t is aggregate technology as de…ned above. This speci…cation implies that managing facilities are more expensive to operate in a technologically more advanced economy. To improve the quality of its products, the …rm invests R t (i) units of …nal goods in R&D. The innovation process is
3 Free movement of labor across …rms implies that wages must be equal across …rms.
The value of the monopolistic …rm in industry i is
The pro…t ‡ow t (i) at time t is
where the parameter s 2 (0; 1) is the rate of R&D subsidies. The monopolistic …rm maximizes (8) subject to (6) and (7). The current-value Hamiltonian for this optimization problem is
We solve this optimization problem in the Appendix and …nd that the unconstrained pro…t-maximizing markup ratio is 1= . To analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth, we impose an upper bound > 1 on the markup ratio. 4 Therefore, the equilibrium price becomes
For the rest of this study, we assume that < 1= . In this case, a larger patent breadth leads to a higher markup, and this implication is consistent with Gilbert and Shapiro's (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price". Finally, the return to in-house R&D is increasing in …rm size measured by employment l t (i) = l t for i 2 [0; N t ].
Lemma 1
The return to in-house R&D is given by
Proof. See the Appendix.
Entrants
A …rm that is active at time t must have been born at some earlier date. Following the standard treatment in the literature, we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Z t (i) = Z t for i 2 [0; N t ], by assuming that any new entry at time t has access to the level of aggregate technology Z t . 5 A new …rm pays a setup cost X t (i)F , where F > 0 is a cost parameter, to set up its operation and introduce a new variety of products to the market. 6 We refer to this process as entry. Suppose entry is positive (i.e., _ N t > 0). Then, the no-arbitrage condition is
The familiar Bellman equation implies that the return to entry is
Government
The government chooses an exogenous rate of R&D subsidies s 2 (0; 1). The government collects tax revenue T t from the household, and the balanced-budget condition is
where G t is unproductive government consumption that changes endogenously as in Peretto (2007) . The amount of tax revenue is T t = w t L = (1 )Y t , where 2 (0; 1) is a stationary tax rate on wage income.
Aggregation
Applying symmetry, we derive the labor market clearing condition as
The resource constraint on …nal goods is
Substituting (6) into (4) and imposing symmetry yield the aggregate production function:
where the second equality uses (16) and markup pricing p t (i) = .
5 See Peretto (1998, 1999, 2007) for a discussion of the symmetric equilibrium being a reasonable equilibrium concept in this class of models. 6 The setup cost is proportional to the new …rm's initial volume of output. This assumption captures the idea that the setup cost depends on the amount of productive assets required to start production; see Peretto (2007) for a discussion. 7 We follow the standard approach in this class of models to treat entry and exit symmetrically (i.e., the scrap value of exiting an industry is also X t (i)F ); therefore, V t = X t (i)F always holds. If V t > X t (i)F (V t < X t (i)F ), then there would be an in…nite number of entries (exits). 8 We could follow Peretto (2007) to consider an extension that allows for a positive externality e¤ect of N t on Y t by modifying (4) to
di, where 2 (0; 1). In this case, (18) 
Our main results are robust to this modi…cation although the dynamic analysis becomes much more complicated. Derivations are available upon request.
Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fA t ; C t ; Y t ; l t (i); X t (i); R t (i)g and prices fr t ; w t ; p t (i); V t (i)g. Also, at each instant of time, the following conditions hold:
Households maximize utility taking fr t ; w t g as given;
Competitive …nal goods …rms maximize pro…ts taking fp t (i); w t g as given;
Incumbents
The value of all existing monopolistic …rms adds up to the value of household's assets such that A t = N t V t ;
The market-clearing condition of labor holds such that L = N t l t ;
The market-clearing condition of …nal goods holds such that
Dynamics
In this subsection, we analyze the dynamics of the model. In the Appendix, we show that the consumption-output ratio C t =Y t jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value. This equilibrium property simpli…es the analysis of transition dynamics.
Lemma 2 The consumption-output ratio jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value:
Equations (18) and (19) imply that for any given and ,
where the last equality uses the Euler equation in (3). Combining (12) , (16) and (20), we derive the equilibrium growth rate given by
which is increasing in …rm size l t determined by employment per …rm L=N t . 9 From (21), the growth rate g t is strictly positive if and only if
Intuitively, innovation requires each …rm's market size to be large enough so that it is profitable for …rms to do in-house R&D. A su¢ cient market size requires the number of …rms to be below a critical level N . If N t > N , then there are too many …rms diluting the return to R&D. As a result, …rms do not invest in R&D, and the growth rate of vertical innovation is zero. In the Appendix, we provide the derivations of the dynamics of N t .
Lemma 3
The dynamics of N t is determined by a one-dimensional di¤erential equation:
. (22) Proof. See the Appendix.
The di¤erential equation in (22) shows that given any initial value, N t gradually converges to its steady-state value denoted as N . 11 On the transition path, the number of varieties N t determines …rm size L=N t and the equilibrium growth rate g t according to (21) . When N t evolves toward the steady state, g t also gradually converges to its steady-state value g . The following proposition derives the steady-state values fN ; g g.
Proposition 1 Under the parameter restrictions
the economy is stable and has a positive and unique steady-state value of N t . The steady-state values fN ; g g are given by
Proof. See the Appendix. 9 Considering data on employment, R&D personnel, and the number of establishments in the US for the period from 1964 to 2001, Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction from this class of models that economic growth is increasing in average …rm size. 10 It is useful to note that _ Z t =Z t is a function of N t given by (21) . 11 In this model, we have assumed zero population growth, so that N t converges to a steady state. If we assume positive population growth, it would be the number of …rms per capita that converges to a steady state instead, and our main results would be unchanged. 12 These parameter restrictions would depend on a larger set of parameters if we parameterize R&D productivity in (7) and the productivity in producing intermediate goods from …nal goods. For simplicity, we have implicitly normalized these productivity parameters to unity.
Patent breadth versus R&D subsidies
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies. In Section 3.1, we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth on the number of …rms, …rm size and economic growth. In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies. In Section 3.3, we introduce a subsidy to entry and analyze its e¤ects on the number of …rms, …rm size and economic growth.
E¤ects of patent breadth
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth. Equation (21) shows that the initial impact of a larger patent breadth on the equilibrium growth rate g t is positive because N t is …xed in the short run. This result captures the standard positive e¤ects of patent breadth on monopolistic pro…ts and innovation as in previous studies, such as Li (2001), Chu (2011), Chu and Furukawa (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) . However, in the long run, the market structure is endogenous and the number of …rms adjusts. In particular, the higher pro…t margin attracts the entry of …rms, which in turn reduces …rm size L=N t and decreases the incentives for innovation. This negative entry e¤ect dominates the positive pro…t-margin e¤ect such that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g becomes lower than the original steady-state level. Therefore, allowing for the endogeneity of market structure, the present study extends previous studies in the literature by demonstrating the contrasting short-run and long-run e¤ects of patent breadth on economic growth. Proposition 2 summarizes the results. Figures 1 and 2 plot the transition paths of fg t ; N t g when increases at time t.
Proposition 2
The initial e¤ect of a larger patent breadth on economic growth is positive as a result of increased monopolistic pro…ts. In the long run, higher pro…t margin attracts the entry of …rms and reduces …rm size. The smaller …rm size decreases incentives for innovation and the steady-state growth rate.
Proof. Equation (21) shows that for a given N t , @g t =@ > 0. Equations (23) and (24) show that @N =@ > 0 and @g =@ < 0.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
E¤ects of R&D subsidies
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies. Equation (21) shows that the initial impact of a higher rate of R&D subsidies s on the equilibrium growth rate g t is positive given N t . On the transition path, the higher rate of R&D subsidies makes in-house R&D more attractive relative to entry. As a result, resources reallocate from entry to inhouse R&D, and the number of …rms decreases. The smaller number of …rms increases …rm size, which further improves the incentives for in-house R&D. This positive …rm size e¤ect strengthens the initial positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies such that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g increases further above the initial level. Therefore, the endogeneity of market structure ampli…es the positive e¤ects of R&D subsidies on economic growth. Peretto (1998) and Segerstrom (2000) also analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in a scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model. Segerstrom (2000) …nds that R&D subsidies can have either positive or negative e¤ects on economic growth, and this interesting result is driven by the tradeo¤ between quality improvement and variety expansion on economic growth. In contrast, economic growth is solely based on quality improvement in the present study and in Peretto (1998) , who also …nds a positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies on economic growth; see Peretto and Connolly (2007) who show that quality improvement is the only plausible engine of economic growth in the long run. Proposition 3 summarizes the results. Figures 3 and 4 plot the transition paths of fg t ; N t g when s increases at time t.
Proposition 3
The initial e¤ect of a higher rate of R&D subsidies on economic growth is positive. In the long run, …rms exit the market, and …rm size increases. The larger …rm size further strengthens the incentives for innovation and increases the steady-state growth rate.
Proof. Equation (21) shows that for a given N t , @g t =@s > 0. Equations (23) and (24) show that @N =@s < 0 and @g =@s > 0.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here] 
Extension: E¤ects of entry subsidies
In this subsection, we extend the baseline model by allowing for a subsidy to entry denoted by e 2 (0; 1). In this case, the entry condition in (13) becomes
Furthermore, the government's balanced-budget condition is modi…ed to
The rest of the model is the same as before. Following the same procedures as before, 13 we derive the same equilibrium growth rate in (21) and the steady-state equilibrium number of varieties given by
1= (1 ) (1 e) F
1= (1 ) 1= (1 ) ( 13 The derivations are available upon request.
which is naturally increasing in the entry subsidy rate e. Given that the equilibrium growth rate is given by (21) as before and does not directly depend on e, an increase in entry subsidies does not a¤ect economic growth initially. However, given that entry subsidies attract entry and reduce …rm size, the equilibrium growth rate gradually decreases during the transition path and converges to a lower steady-state value. If we think of entry as horizontal R&D, then this analysis implies that horizontal R&D subsidies can be harmful to economic growth, and this …nding is consistent with Peretto (2007) . In other words, in order for R&D subsidies to have a positive e¤ect on economic growth, policymakers need to design a subsidy (or tax-deduction) system that distinguishes between di¤erent types of R&D activities. For the rest of this subsection, we consider symmetric R&D and entry subsidies by setting e = s = s. Given that entry subsidies e have no e¤ect on the initial growth rate, an increase in s must have the same initial positive e¤ect on the growth rate g t as R&D subsidies. As for the long-run e¤ect on the number of …rms, (27) becomes
which is increasing (decreasing) in s if the following inequality holds:
If N is decreasing in s, then the long-run e¤ect of s on g must be positive. If N is increasing in s, then a higher rate of subsidies s would have a negative indirect e¤ect on long-run growth through entry partly o¤setting the direct positive e¤ect of s on growth. Substituting (28) into (21) yields
which is increasing in s if and only if the following inequality holds:
Given the parameter restriction =(1 s) > in Proposition 1, this inequality holds if is su¢ ciently small. In other words, the overall long-run growth e¤ect of symmetric R&D and entry subsidies s is generally ambiguous. If the discount rate is su¢ ciently small, then an increase in s would have a positive e¤ect on long-run growth.
Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the di¤erent implications of two important policy instruments, patent breadth and R&D subsidies, on economic growth and market structure in a 14 It can be shown that (1 ) ( 1) > F is su¢ cient (but not necessary) for this inequality to hold.
scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model with EMS. We …nd that when the number of …rms is …xed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies serve to increase economic growth as in previous studies. However, when the number of …rms adjusts endogenously in the long run, these two commonly discussed policy instruments have surprisingly opposing e¤ects on economic growth and market structure. Speci…cally, patent breadth decreases economic growth but expands the number of …rms, whereas R&D subsidies reduce the number of …rms but increase economic growth. These contrasting e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies suggest that R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the purpose of stimulating economic growth. This …nding is consistent with evidence from empirical studies and case studies discussed in the introduction. Given our result that the endogeneity of market structure leads to di¤erent short-run and long-run e¤ects of patent breadth, it is important for policymakers to take into consideration the di¤erent implications of patent policy reform in the short run and in the long run.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (6), (9) and the constraint p t (i) into (10) yields
where t (j) is the multiplier on p t (i) and t (j) = 0 if p t (i) < . The …rst-order conditions include
Substituting (A3) and the constrained monopolistic price p t (i) = < 1= from (A2) into (A4) yields
where we have also applied the symmetry condition Z t (j) = Z t .
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting V t = X t F from (13) into A t = N t V t yields
where the last equality uses p t = and p t X t N t = Y t . Using (A6) and (2), we obtain
Substituting the Euler equation and w t L = (1 )Y t into (A7) yields
Therefore, the dynamics of C t =Y t is characterized by saddle-point stability such that C t =Y t must jump to its steady-state value in (19) .
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (9), (13) and p t (i) = into (14) yields
where we have applied _ V t =V t = _ X t =X t . Substituting (16) and p t (i) = into (6) yields
where we have applied Z t (i) = Z t . Substituting (7) and (A10) into (A9) yields
where we have used _ X t =X t = _ Z t =Z t _ N t =N t . Substituting (20) into (A11) yields the dynamics of N t given by
Equation (A12) describes the dynamics of N t when N t < N . When N t > N , _ Z t =Z t = 0 as shown in (21) .
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof proceeds as follows. First, we prove that under < min f =(1 s); (1 )( 1)=F g, there exists a stable, unique and positive steadystate value of N t . Substituting (21) into the …rst equation of (22) yields
Because N t is a state variable, the dynamics of N t is stable if and only if (1 s) < . Solving _ N t = 0, we obtain the steady-state value of N t in an economy with positive in-house R&D given by
Given (1 s) < , (A14) shows that N > 0 if and only if < (1 )( 1)=F . Combining this inequality with (1 s) < , we have < min 1 s ;
Finally, substituting (A14) into (21) yields
which is positive if and only if the following inequality holds:
(1 s)F
2
(1 s)( 1) + ( 1) > 0, and this inequality holds if is su¢ ciently small (or su¢ ciently large). 
